

LECTURE 13: GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES

See Barro Ch. 12

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WHERE ARE WE? TAKING STOCK

- ▶ We have a model of the business cycle with money
- ▶ We can talk about how shocks to productivity A impact wages, real interest rates r , labor supply, capital utilization, unemployment.
- ▶ We can talk about how shocks to money impact real behavior (it doesn't, so far) and nominal variables like nominal interest rates i , the price level P , and inflation π
- ▶ So far we've mostly left the government out
- ▶ But government is a big deal, and we'll start talking about how government expenditures and taxes impact behavior

THE PLAN


- ▶ Talk a little about what's actually happened in U.S. expenditures
- ▶ Introduce government spending into the household budget constraint

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE


- ▶ It's convenient to break down government expenditure into three categories:
 1. Government purchases of goods and services (52%)
 2. Transfer payments (40%)
 3. Interest payments (9%)
- ▶ Government expenditures have increased as a fraction of GDP over time
- ▶ But each component has seen different rates of growth

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES BY CATEGORY

Figure 12.1 Total Government Expenditure, Purchases, Transfers, and Interest Payments



GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES BY CATEGORY (UPDATE)




THINKING ABOUT COMPONENTS

- ▶ When thinking about the U.S. budget, it's useful to think about what makes up most categories
- ▶ Purchases can be broken down into:
 - ▶ Federal purchases
 - ▶ Federal defense
 - ▶ State and local purchases
- ▶ Transfers can be broken down into:
 - ▶ Federal transfers
 - ▶ State and local transfers
- ▶ Transfers can be further broken down into the big three:
 - ▶ Medicare
 - ▶ Medicaid
 - ▶ OASDI (Social Security and disability)


GOVERNMENT PURCHASES

Figure 12.2 Breakdown of Government Purchases




GOVERNMENT TRANSFER PAYMENTS

Figure 12.3 Breakdown of Government Transfer Payments



GOVERNMENT TRANSFER PAYMENTS: THE BIG THREE

Figure 12.4 *Transfer Payments for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid*



THINKING ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET CONSTRAINT

- ▶ The government will have two sources of revenue in real terms:

1. A **lump sum** tax T , that doesn't vary by behavior (\$2000/household, in real terms, for instance)

2. Real seigniorage revenue from printing money, $\frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{P_t}$

- ▶ The government spends money on purchases G and real transfers V .

- ▶ So the budget constraint is:

$$G_t + V_t = T_t + \frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{P_t}$$

- ▶ Printing money isn't a big deal for most governments, so we'll simplify this:

$$G_t + V_t = T_t$$

NEW ONE-PERIOD HOUSEHOLD BUDGET CONSTRAINT

- ▶ We had the budget constraint (assuming zero inflation for now, so $i = r$)

$$C_t + \frac{\Delta B_t}{P} + \Delta K_t = \frac{w_t}{P} L_t + r \left(\frac{B_t}{P} + K_t \right)$$

- ▶ Now the government will tax households at T and transfer money to them as V

$$C_t + \frac{\Delta B_t}{P} + \Delta K_t = \frac{w_t}{P} L_t + r \left(\frac{B_t}{P} + K_t \right) + V_t - T_t$$

- ▶ Where before the RHS was “real income” now it’s “real disposable income.”
- ▶ We can combine this budget constraint with future budget constraints again to get the net present value budget constraint.

NEW MANY-PERIOD HOUSEHOLD BUDGET CONSTRAINT

- ▶ We had the NPV budget constraint

$$C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1+r_1} + \frac{C_3}{1+r_2} + \dots = (1+r_0) \left(\frac{B_0}{P} + K_0 \right) + \frac{w_1}{P} L_1 + \frac{\frac{w_2}{P} L_2}{1+r_1} + \frac{\frac{w_3}{P} L_3}{1+r_2} + \dots$$

- ▶ Now we just have the net present value of all taxes and transfers:

$$C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1+r_1} + \frac{C_3}{1+r_2} + \dots = (1+r_0) \left(\frac{B_0}{P} + K_0 \right) + \frac{w_1}{P} L_1 + \frac{\frac{w_2}{P} L_2}{1+r_1} + \frac{\frac{w_3}{P} L_3}{1+r_2} + \dots + (V_1 - T_1) + \frac{(V_2 - T_2)}{1+r_1} + \frac{(V_3 - T_3)}{1+r_2} + \dots$$

- ▶ This is incredibly simple: we're just discounting all expenditures and revenues, adding one set of terms...
- ▶ But it has an very powerful prediction! (What?)

PREDICTION

- ▶ Let's say the government gives a big tax cut in period 1 (or even a big transfer) and finances it with tax hikes in all future periods
- ▶ What happens to my behavior?

$$\underbrace{(V_1 - T_1)}_{\uparrow} + \underbrace{\frac{(V_2 - T_2)}{1 + r_1}}_{\downarrow} + \underbrace{\frac{(V_3 - T_3)}{1 + r_2}}_{\downarrow} + \underbrace{\frac{(V_4 - T_4)}{1 + r_3}}_{\downarrow} + \dots$$

- ▶ My NPV budget constraint hasn't changed!
- ▶ So my consumption behavior won't change.
- ▶ I just save the tax cut and have a little extra money to pay for the higher taxes in future periods

PERMANENT CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT PURCHASES-I

- ▶ We want to think about how the economy changes when there are permanent changes to G
- ▶ What happens to household behavior? Recall that $\text{spending} + \text{transfers} = \text{taxes}$.

$$G + V = T$$

- ▶ But the household side only cares about $V - T$, so we can write:

$$V - T = -G$$

- ▶ When spending (G) goes up, households are either transferred less ($V \downarrow$) or taxed more ($T \uparrow$).
- ▶ Let's ignore labor for now, assume it's perfectly inelastic

PERMANENT CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT PURCHASES-II

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- ▶ Y stays the same, and the increase in G is met with an equal decrease in C

PERMANENT CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT PURCHASES-III


- ▶ Permanent increases in government spending don't impact interest rates because it doesn't impact MPK
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- ▶ We have an incredible conclusion: permanent increases in government spending G don't impact real GDP!
- ▶ Permanent increases in government spending **do** decrease consumption, at a 1-1 rate.
- ▶ Permanent increases in government spending do not decrease investment at all.
- ▶ This is the basic idea of "crowd-out."

PERMANENT CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT PURCHASES-EMPIRICS

- ▶ So our prediction is that permanent increases in G shouldn't impact GDP at all
- ▶ One (unsatisfactory) way to look at this is to look at the time-series correlation between government spending and real GDP over the business cycle

PERMANENT CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT PURCHASES-EMPIRICS

Figure 12.7 *Cyclical Behavior of U.S. Real GDP and Government Purchases*



PERMANENT CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT PURCHASES-EMPIRICS

- ▶ So our prediction is that permanent increases in G shouldn't impact GDP much (at all)
- ▶ One way to look at this is to look at the correlation between government spending and real GDP
- ▶ There is very little correlation between government spending and real GDP (slightly negative)
- ▶ This is a confirmation of our hypothesis
- ▶ Anybody see any problems with this?

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- ▶ Consequently, reduce investment (save less/borrow) by \$0.95 this period
- ▶ Then, increase investment (save more/pay off debt) by \$0.05 more each period, decreasing consumption by \$0.05.

SUMMARIZING OUR RESULTS SO FAR

How do government purchases impact aggregates?

G change (+1)	$\Delta(V - T)$	ΔC	ΔI	Δw	Δr	ΔL	$\Delta \kappa$
Permanent Increase	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0
Temporary increase (1st period only)	-1	$-\frac{1}{N}$	$\frac{N-1}{N}$	0	0	0	0
Temporary increase (all other periods)	-1	$-\frac{1}{N}$	$\frac{1}{N}$	0	0	0	0

- ▶ Where N is the number of periods you're smoothing over.
- ▶ This is easy to remember!
 - ▶ People want to smooth. If they can (temporary shocks to income) then they do through through reducing savings/investment.
 - ▶ If they can't (permanent shocks) then they do so through reducing consumption.

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 - ▶ War!
- ▶ Let's look at WWI, WWII, Korean War, and the Vietnam War

FOUR WARS FROM AN ECONOMIC STANDPOINT

Aggregates as a percent of Trend

Category	WWI	WWII	Korean War	Vietnam War
Defense Purchases	697%	317%	25%	15%
% of trend real GDP	16%	44%	3%	1%
Real GDP	8%	36%	3%	2%
Consumption	-5%	0%	0%	1%
Gross Investment	-28%	-51%	0%	1%
Government (nondef)	0%	-19%	3%	1%
Employment	8%	17%	1%	1%
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TAKEAWAYS & FAILURE

GDP vs. Defense Purchases (level)
(billions of 1996 dollars)

Category	WWI	WWII	Korean
Defense Purchases	\$84	\$537	\$56
GDP	\$42	\$433	\$49

- ▶ Real GDP goes up
- ▶ But by less than military purchases
- ▶ Consequently other parts of GDP must go down (which?)
 - ▶ In WWI, investment, consumption
 - ▶ In WWII, investment, government
- ▶ Our big failure is that real GDP goes up while our model predicts it shouldn't move at all!

WHY DID WE FAIL?

- ▶ When we did our analysis, we fixed labor supply
- ▶ Fixing labor supply made it so income effects of being taxed didn't increase labor supply, which would impact capital markets, and change our entire analysis
- ▶ Employment shoots up during wartime: +8%, +17%, +1%, +1% above trend for each war.
- ▶ This is a big deal!
- ▶ Why does labor supply shoot up?

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 3. Family planning: people put off children, work instead

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
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Figure 12.8 *Effect of a Wartime Increase in Labor Supply on the Labor Market*



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
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- ▶ Nonetheless this is discomfiting, either a failure or a lackluster success
- ▶ Our theory has a few successes, but empirics are less clear than we've had in Chapters 3-11.
- ▶ What about capital markets? What should happen when labor supply increases?

LABOR SUPPLY INCREASES, SO CAPITAL DEMAND INCREASES TOO!

Figure 12.9 Effect of a Wartime Increase in Labor Input on the Market for Capital Services



PREDICTIONS FOR CAPITAL MARKETS

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- ▶ This again represents a failure and poses questions for our equilibrium model that are ongoing today